| The African Union : Any lessons from the European Union? |
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by Thobile Yanta who presented the paper to the 13th IIRA World Congress, Berlin, Germany, 8th to 12th September 2003 The issue of regional integration in Africa has been a subject of debate for some time. Political leaders and progressive academics provided various suggestions of how Africa should be unified. The struggle against slavery, colonialism and apartheid in Africa gave further impetus to the subject of regional integration. Political leaders such as Nkwameh Nkrumah of Ghana and Julias Nyerere of Tanzania argued that the political and economic unity of African countries was the very essence of independence. These leaders identified the colonialists' strategy of divide and rule as a stumbling block to the unity and integration of the continent. The existence of 'unity blocks' such as the Cassablanca Group and Monrovia Group in the 1950s demonstrated the tricky nature of attempting to develop a common political and development agenda in a deeply divided continent. The formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 was regarded as a key achievement and a stepping stone towards realising unity in Africa. From the very first post-colonial meetings, African leaders emphasised regional integration as one of the key elements of a post-independence strategy. The idea of regional integration was regarded as a means through which African countries would 'pool their economic sovereignty' in order to improve the living standards of their peoples and to extend the struggle for political decolonisation into one for economic decolonisation. Other continental programmes such as the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) in the 1980s also advocated regional integration as central to the socio-economic development of the continent. For instance, member states' views were that setting-up infrastructure such as transport and communication facilities would facilitate the promotion of intra-and extra-African trade. African countries recognised that regional cooperation in areas such as developing regional institutions, capital markets and research institutes, tackling common environmental issues, controlling infectious diseases as well as preventing, managing, and resolving conflict is important for Africa's growth and development path. In an increasingly integrated world, there was also a gradual realisation among African states that sub-regional and regional groupings provide higher visibility to global investors, promote cross-border trade and investment, and reduce production and marketing costs. The aim of this paper is to examine the regional integration and its development implications in Africa. More specifically, how the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU), as Africa's premier institutions, are making a contribution or lack thereof, to regional integration in Africa and examine whether or not Africa can draw any lessons from the EU's experience of regional integration. Regional integration in this paper refers to the "unification of neighbouring states working within a framework to promote free movements of goods, services and factors of production and co-ordinate and harmonise their policies" (Lee 2002). This might involve convergence of trade, fiscal, debt management and monetary policies as a prelude to integration. It also refers to a process and a means by which a group of countries strive to increase their levels of welfare: reduction of poverty, indebtedness, conflicts, wars, economic and political malaise. Regional integration recognises that partnership between countries can achieve these goals in a more efficient way than unilateral or independent pursuance of policy in each country. For instance, in Africa, one of the primary aims of regional integration was to promote development among African countries as well as help reduce indebtedness and dependence on western countries.
2. Objectives of regional integration Regional integration is generally regarded as having other potential opportunities such as expansion of trade, pooling resources for investment, enlarging local markets and contributing to industrialisation. Those who advocate regional integration also view it as a potent strategy for accelerated economic growth, poverty reduction and lessening of conflicts. It must be stressed that regional integration in Africa is primarily, but not exclusively, economic. While there was always hope that regional integration would increase the economic bargaining power of African countries, it was also regarded as a political project aimed at increasing their political influence and ensure peace and stability in the region. Where regional economic organisations in Africa did have any significant impact on relationships, this was more likely to be in the field of security than of economic development. The intervention of Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone is sometimes cited as an example of a collective regional action by African states (Clapham). Mechanisms for dealing with raging wars and perpetual conflicts in the continent were among the primary missions of the OAU. The improvement in the political climate in the region i.e. peace and stability was regarded as fundamental for creating the right environment for sustainable economic development. These are also the values that NEPAD is currently using to 'market' Africa to the rest of the world. According to Keet (2002) some of the strategic aims and objectives of African unity are well detailed in various policy documents and debates. These include:
More than any other region in the world, Africa has a strong case for pursuing regional integration. Studies conducted by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the World Bank have found that Africa is still the most subdivided continent in the world: "At least 165 borders divide 51 countries. The average African country has the same economy of a typical American town of 60 000 people. In Sub-Saharan Africa, there is one phone line per 200 inhabitants (excluding South Africa); less than one in five Africans use electricity; there are more internet connections in New York City than in Africa; and only 16 percent of the roads are paved" (Akukwe 2002). The formation of the Europe Union shows that regional integration substantially improved the economic performance of the smaller countries like Belgium. These small European economies today register much higher productivity rates, are highly competitive, and command a more effective market share than the whole of sub-Saharan Africa. Regional economic integration is already attracting a lot of attention in the developing world, and attempts are currently under-way to either revamp dormant regional groupings, to breathe new life into weak ones or to build new ones altogether. Nearly all the countries constituting the membership of the WTO have concluded Regional Trading Agreements (RTAs) with other countries. In the period 1948-1994, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) contacting parties notified 108 RTAs relating to trade in goods, of which 38 were enforced in the five years ending in 1994 (African Development Report 2000). Every continental region has a least one major integration movement. Pangeti (1997) states that some of the examples of global and regional integration include the European Union (EU), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), European Economic Area (EEA), Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), South American Free Trade Area (SAFTA), Andean Common Market (ANCOM), Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) and MERCOSUR. Africa has, since the colonial period, had several regional experiments, such as the East African community (EAC), the Central African Federation (CAF), and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). More regional groupings emerged after independence, the most prominent being the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS -1975), the West African Economic Community (WAEC -1966) which became the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU -1994), the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC -1980) which is now the Southern African Development Community (SADC-1992), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern African States (COMESA). Globally, economic integration has taken various levels and assumed many forms. These can be summarised into:
While regional integration in Africa has also taken different forms to accommodate the changing national, regional and international environment, all organisation that integrate regional economies have adopted market integration as a component of their strategy, with a view to increasing intra-regional trade. Lee (2002) defines market integration as a linear progression of degrees of integration beginning with a free trade area or in some cases a preferential trade area and ending up with total economic integration. However, critics have questioned whether market integration in Africa not part of the problem as opposed to a solution. For instance, McCarthy (cited in Lee 2002) contests that instead of market integration, regional economic organisation in Africa should focus on regional co-operation, with market integration as a future goal. At this stage of its socio-economic challenges, there is a need for Africa to maintain a balance between market integration and development integration.
3. Has Africa benefited from regional integration?
In Africa, efforts towards regional integration have not yielded the desired results because of a number of factors, although some have done better than others. Pangeti (1997) argues that the reasons for this poor performance include the following:
It can generally be concluded that regional economic integration in Africa has been a failure to date, in terms of:
4. NEPAD, AU and regional integration The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) as the most recent African development initiative also regards the issue of regional integration as one of the key mechanisms to solving Africa’s problems. Regional integration is seen as one of the fundamental ways of terminating Africa’s exclusion from "the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising world [paragraph 1]." The NEPAD document also states that "the objective is to bridge existing gaps between Africa and the developed countries so as to improve the continent’s international competitiveness and to enable her to participate in the globalisation process." NEPAD, at various points, touches on many of these aims and the motivations for African cooperation and integration outlined above. These include the observation that "most African countries are small both in terms of population and per capita income" [paragraph 93]; the need for Africans "to pool their resources and enhance regional development…." [Paragraph 94]; and the importance of "the provision of essential regional public goods, such as transport, energy, water, ITC, environmental preservations, disease eradication, regional research capacity…" [paragraph 95]. The decision taken by African countries to form the African Union (AU) and its social and economic recovery plan, NEPAD is a recognition that after many decades of economic and political planning, Africa has not made much progress in the implementation of earlier development plans. With the overthrow of apartheid in South Africa, there was increasing realisation that something needed to be done to inject new spirit into African development programmes. The use of phrases such as the "African Renaissance", the "African Century" and the "Africa's time has arrived" are just some of the innovative ways used in an attempt to change the doom-and-gloom perceptions about Africa. Various meetings that occurred between the NEPAD crafters and the IMF, World Bank, EU, G-8 were also designed to deal with changing the negative perceptions about Africa. What distinguishes NEPAD from the past African development plans in many respects, is that its crafters view the partnership between North-South and South-South as fundamental to achieving much-needed socio-economic progress in the continent. As a way of seeking to stop the "marginalisation of Africa" from the global community, NEPAD recognises globalisation as a force that has a direct bearing on the development path of developing countries such as those in Africa. The general requirement of globalisation is that countries should become part of international rules and regulations i.e. multi-lateral system of governance. Specifically, this requires increased discipline by governments to maintain sound and consistent macro-economic and structural policies. In this vein, NEPAD seeks to move away from "closed regionalism" to a more open model. Many of the trade blocks that were formed between developing countries in the 1960s and 1970s were based on a model of import-substituting development, and regional agreements with high external trade barriers were used as a way of implementing this model (Schiff, A and Winters A.L 2003). President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and president Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria were particularly key to ensuring that Africa does not vanish from the "radar screens" of the Western world. Ironically, it is these kinds of extensive consultations that have landed NEPAD into criticisms that it is more accountable to the Western-oriented institutions and governments than to African constituencies. These African leaders though have been quite adamant that in order to succeed, Africa needs to open up and seek to learn from the successful economies such as those from the EU. In many ways, the project of the AU was aimed at taking over where OAU has left off, though few but significant adjustments had to be made. For instance, unlike the OAU, the founding Constitutive Act of the AU states that governments that come to power by undemocratic means will be suspended and subject to sanctions. The AU also has the power to intervene in the internal affairs of member states to deal with war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. The quest for unity, poverty eradication, economic and social development are also regarded as key factors behind the establishment of the AU. Its formation is attributable to the arguments by the key players within Africa that continental organisations should be restructured to ensure their efficient functioning and to reflect the needs and demands of Africa in the 21st century. The vision for AU is summed up as followed:
5. Can the AU and NEPAD draw any lessons from the EU? In many ways, it is rather unfair to compare Africa's experience of regional integration with that of the EU because of different levels of economic development, divergent historical and socio-political experiences. The EU is in many a unique case of ‘north-north’ integration of developed capitalist economies. It is therefore, hard to draw wider lessons from this experience for ‘south-south’ integration. For instance, in terms of different historical legacies, the EU never experienced colonialism as Africa did, never experienced slavery and apartheid, their economies never went through Structural Adjustment Programmes as demanded by the IMF and World Bank in Africa. However, relationship between Africa and Europe goes back a long way. The two regions are geographically and historically bound i.e. colonial relations, Yaounde and the Lome conventions, and Cotonou agreements are just some examples of how the two regions have interacted. Trade and development co-operation between Europe, Africa and other developing countries started with the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2001). In a sense, the birth of NEPAD has further strengthened the ties between Africa and Europe. Through such interactions, there is no doubt that the experiences of regional integration such as those from the EU had some influence in shaping the thinking of African leaders on the issue of regional integration. Also, the recent growth in regionalism has been dominated by the EU's activities. These include the "extension of the Single Market Programme to neighbouring countries that were not yet members of the EU, the signing of Europe Agreements with countries of the Eastern Europe and formation of a single currency. Member states of that union count among the richest countries in the world. On average nationals there are among the best educated, most productive and enjoy the best living standards" (EU 2002). It is against this background that even former Soviet republics are eager to learn as much from the EU's regional integration experience. For this reason, regional integration is thus seen as a panacea for economic ills of developing countries such as those in Africa. Even though the relations between Africa and Europe have continued over the years, these have not translated into Africa achieving its key independence objectives such as unity, regional integration and economic independence. Obstacles to regional integration in Africa are well recorded. As previously stated, among them is the issue of trust among members. One very important lesson that the AU can draw from the EU's experience is that integration requires mutual trust and confidence between partners as well as a perception that their interests in various issues are compatible (Winters 1997). The lack of commitment to regionalism in Africa has manifested in member countries developing strategies, plans and priorities independently. The EU/SA Free Trade Agreement (FTA) constitutes an example of this phenomenon. South Africa signed the agreement knowing that it would have a devastating impact on both the members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). By acting independent of other regional countries, South Africa was trying to maximise benefits for itself at the expense of regional members. The persistence of colonial legacy has also prevented Africa from forming a strong position on regional cooperation. For instance, in West Africa, the inability of the Anglophone and Francophone countries to break their colonial heritages and to form effective economic groupings that cut across them became one of the key obstacles to successful integration. In fact, some of the erstwhile colonial powers have encouraged this disunity among African countries as it served their geo-political interests. What makes the EU the strong regional community it is today is because of unity of purpose that is expressed both at the theoretical and practical levels. The position of the EU on common agricultural policy is just one example of unity in what is considered to be a very strategic regional issue. Institution building has also been a key for consolidation and co-ordination of important integration activities. Institutions require deep commitment of resources such as finance and personnel. In the case of Africa, funding of institutions has been one of the key obstacles to the implementation of programmes. For example the OAU's programmes were constrained by huge debts mainly caused by members countries who were in arrears. The AU is facing similar problems. Eight countries are being threatened with exclusion for failing to pay their membership fees. Five countries -- South Africa, Libya, Algeria, Egypt and Nigeria -- are currently providing most of the AU resources. These countries are responsible for 40% of the AU every year (Mail&GuardianOnline, July 23, 2003). This is obviously not sustainable in the long run as these countries also have their own domestic development problems to tackle. As a way of tackling the problem, the outgoing Chairman of the AU, President Mbeki, suggested in a recent meeting of the AU in Maputo, Mozambique that creative ways have to be found to deal with the issue of resources. Problems of weak institutional capacity in Africa are also exacerbated by brain drain, prevailing under-resourcing of educational institutions, and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. In terms of the need to find alternative sources of funding for AU activities, African leaders need thread carefully as experience shows that dependence on aid has led to African governments virtually ceding their economic and social policies to external agencies. In some cases, this has resulted into widespread corruption and lack of accountability by the ruling class. The AU's long-term viability and credibility will rely on its ability to be self-reliant in terms of resources i.e. finance and technical capacity. In terms of latter, the AU needs to provide enough incentives to attract skilled Africans who left their countries because of persecution, bad governance and abuse of power by governments. Also, NEPAD's recommendation that Africans from the 'diaspora' become part of the change processes in Africa should be welcomed. Such actions will go a long way in making Africa the political and economic force that it deserves to be. Human and social capitals are some of the ingredients that Africa desperately needs in order to prosper. It must be stressed though that shortage of resources and lack of institutional capacity are not the only reason why collective regional development efforts in Africa have not taken off the ground. African countries' unwillingness to sacrifice sovereignty and fear of change are some of the reasons that make Africa to lag behind. For example, only 15 of the 53 countries have thus far, agreed to be peer reviewed. The Peer Review mechanism is one of NEPAD's proposals for promoting good governance in the continent. The ratification of Pan-African Parliament has also hit a snag. So far, only 11 member countries have confirmed ratification. At least 27 member countries must ratify the Pan-African Parliament before it comes into force. The apparent lack of buy-in from the rest of the members is a problem that NEPAD still has to address. For instance, some of the African leaders hold the view that NEPAD should not interfere with political, security and conflict resolution issues. The EU's experience shows that the evolution and achievement of regional integration involved compromises, trade-offs and patience. For example, achieving a single currency entailed surrendering a fundamental element of sovereignty and foregoing a major tool of economic management. Perhaps the AU needs to engage in confidence building measures and ensure that states comprehend the potential of a collective power. Such a process will require a gradual approach to ensure that states, one-by-one, become willing participants in change processes. As part of institution building mechanisms, the AU has ambitious plans to establish 17 different institutional organs. These include Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOC), Pan African Parliament, Court of Justice, Financial institutions (African Central Bank, African Monitoring Fund, Africa Investment Bank), The Assembly of the Union, The executive Council, The Commission, The permanent Representative Council and The Specialised Technical Committee(SABC 2003). Peace and Security Council (PSC) is regarded as essential because it will formalise the establishment of African Peace Keeping Force. The AU regards the current levels of conflicts and instability in the region as inimical to the ideals of peace and stability. The EU's institutions also include The Commission, Council of Ministers, Parliament, Court of Justice, European Central Bank and so on. Given, the EU's institutional arrangements, there is no doubt that the AU has learned some important lessons. Even the African Peer Review Mechanism in the AU is designed along the lines of Growth and Stability Pact within the EU. Both institutions are designed to ensure accountability, good governance and ethical administration. The institutional designs in both the EU and the AU are designed to provide strategic direction and coordination of tactical processes. A high level of institutional capacity and investment of human resources in research, negotiation and monitoring has been important to the success of the EU. However, given the current resource and capacity challenges facing the AU, it remains to be seen whether institutions modeled along the lines of the EU will be appropriate for Africa's specific conditions. For instance, the secretariat, currently operating on a budget of $31-million, is estimate to increase in size to 749 people with a budget of $53-million. Over the years, the EU has become a very expensive organisation, it will therefore, be difficult for the AU to seek to emulate the EU's institutional model without seeking to make drastic amendments to it. The AU will have to consider prioritising what is workable under the current conditions i.e. under-development, unfair terms of trade, poverty, diseases, wars and instability.
6. Specific Challenges facing NEPAD and AU If NEPAD is to succeed in its regional integration objectives, there are a number of questions that need to be addressed. These include, to what extent are African countries willing to take practical measures necessary to give practical effect to their declared objectives? Why has there been a striking contradiction between each sub-region's general emphasis on the need for regional integration in Africa and the scant evidence of practical success? Why has regionalism been less successful in Africa than anywhere else? There is a need for NEPAD to take stock of what is required to ensure that it threads cautiously given the past regional integration experiences in Africa. Unlike the EU, NEPAD is faced with the twin challenges of dealing with the legacy of poverty, inequality, corruption, and social injustices in the continent whilst confronting the ravages of neo-liberal economic globalisation. The growing inequality, unevenness and injustice embodied in the New World Order have become so pervasive to ignore. Studies by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) have shown that to meet the poverty reduction target of halving poverty by the year 2015, a scenario of balanced policies and an average growth rate of 7 per cent are the minimum requirements. Rates of investment necessary to achieve this growth rate are in excess of 25 per cent of the GDP, annually (ECA 2000). The ECA recommends policies and programmes that promote broad based, labour-absorbing patterns of growth and reduction of income inequality (ECA 2000). As a result of global economic configurations which militates against Africa's interests, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to Africa declined by more than 13% in 2000, according to UNCTAD. The slump was primarily the reflection of a 50% drop in inflows to the continent's main recipient countries of FDI - Angola, Morocco and South Africa. Flows to other African countries were more or less stable. FDI into North Africa increased last year, to $2.6 billion, while flows to sub-Saharan Africa were down, from $7.9 billion in 1999 to $6.4 billion in 2000. Within sub-Saharan Africa, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) remained the most important subregion in terms of FDI inflows, which nonetheless dropped from $5.3 billion in 1999 to $3.9 billion in 2000. Africa's share in world FDI inflows is still very weak, falling below 1% last year. But despite this recent decline, investment flows to the continent are still much higher than in the early 1990s, as African countries have made considerable efforts to enhance their investment climate. Despite the well professed and articulated benefits of globalisation mainly based on West-centred 'knowledges', the trade and development experience of African countries prove otherwise. The difference between West-centred 'knowledges' and others lies in emphasis and insights, which are seen in different elements and dynamics. Whilst the majority of Western-centred 'knowledge emphasise the 'time-space compression, shrinking world, new technologies etc, non- Western 'knowledges' highlight growing poverty and inequality (Manboah-Rockson 1999). Ikeme (2000) also cautions against Africa buying uncritically into the neo-liberal approaches to globalisation. His view is that: "African countries should move away from the ideology of unrestrained export-led growth and move towards the creation of policies that seeks to develop production for internal markets as the first option, having recourse to international trade only when clearly much more efficient. To globalise the economy by erasure of economic boundaries through free trade, free capital mobility and free, or at least uncontrolled migration, is to wound fatally the major unit community capable of carrying out any policies of the common good. This is because of the belabored fact that cosmopolitan globalisation weakens national boundaries and the power of national and sub-national communities, while strengthening the relative power of TNCs." Though many organs of civil society have expressed appreciation for the good intentions of NEPAD as a social and economic recovery plan for the continent, questions have been posed as to whether it offers adequate solutions to the current challenges facing Africa and its peoples. For instance, some sections of civil society organisation have raised concerns that NEPAD is too vague on many issues. The labour movement in particular is worried that NEPAD does not mention issues relating to the labour market in a clear sense at all. Hence, fundamental questions are being asked about the position of NEPAD on labour aspect of development. These questions include: what is NEPAD's perspective on labour rights? What structural changes are needed in African labour markets to support investment in skills development and improved work organisation? What measures does NEPAD propose to create large-scale decent jobs in Africa? Other concerns have revolved around the ideological orientation of NEPAD. In particular its 'trickle-down' economics have been regarded as inappropriate to deal with Africa's daunting problems such as poverty and lack of access to basic services. While the market-led development and market integration approaches might have been appropriate for the EU and other regional economic communities around the world, questions are being asked whether these are necessarily the best approaches to tackle Africa's development problems. For instance, there is growing evidence that the poor in Africa have not benefited from the privatisation of essential services such as water, electricity, health and telecommunications. Therefore, NEPAD is being challenged to come up with programmes that are aimed at addressing Africa's core development challenges. In the short to medium term a Western-style market-led approach are viewed as being inappropriate to tackle such development problems. Already, there is evidence that the condition of the poor has deteriorated further as governments across Africa are compelled to cut public expenditures and restrict necessary imports to conserve foreign exchange as part of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank economic restructuring programmes, thereby curtailing investment in productive sectors (Ikeme, 2000). Access to basic services such education, health, potable water, electricity and food has decreased as a result of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). NEPAD is thus, challenged to avoid taking doctrinaire and dogmatic approaches to issues such as privatisation and limiting the role of the state in development. The provision of agricultural subsidies by the EU and US shows that governments' intervention in the economy can be a necessary measure to protect economy and populations against harmful effects of global trade. In Africa, the markets have thus far, had a limited success in providing basic needs and services to the poor. The role of NEPAD should therefore, be the promotion of access to basic services by the poor. Conditions in Africa demands that the states should be strengthened and not weakened. Strong states in the paper are defined as those that "construct their power with society or through society, rather than restricting themselves to power over society. This type of power is reflected in the density of the institutional networks linking state and society, which are key index of strength" (Gelb 2002). The successful implementation of both the AU and NEPAD programmes requires strong alliances between states and civil society in the continent i.e. develop inclusive regional integration strategies. At the moment, one of the fundamental weaknesses of NEPAD is identified as the apparent lack of civil society participation in its formulation. As Landsberg (2003) describes it: "Like many other initiatives in the past, NEPAD was an essentially elite driven initiative, crafted almost exclusively by heads of state and government, and state-dominated institutions. From the word go therefore, NEPAD set itself up for a legitimacy crisis by not opening itself up to other key non-state constituencies". Unlike the AU and NEPAD, the EU's regional integration processes, though not perfect, had some 'democratic components'. For example, the democratic aspects to the evolution of the EU include elections and referenda to approve the countries' membership to the Union (InterAfrica Group/Justice for Africa). In Africa, such an approach has been sadly lacking. Africa can thrive in the new global economy if it combines economic openness with a clear domestic investment strategy and effective civil society and political institutions. It is through the strengthening of collective action that Africa can solve its protracted crisis, and this requires the transcending illusion of independent national development in a continent of fragmented markets and miniscule states (Adedeji 1990). The promotion of sustainable domestic policies is critical if NEPAD is to produce desirable results in the continent. For instance development cannot occur without industrialisation. At the core of the development strategy in Africa should be the need to promote co-ordinated trade development, and industrial policy in a regional integration framework with a stable and predictable policy environment. Many of the past Africa's development plans invariably failed to indicate a well-integrated and coordinated approach. Most of them discussed the progress or individual countries in a disjointed fashion, apparently ignoring the fact that most industries are interrelated and interdependent. These development plans tended to be inward looking, and to refer to measures for increasing economic growth within the country concerned. Consequently, none of the development programmes initiated during the early 1960's attempted to coordinate industrial development in one country with the industrial growth of the neighbouring country (Asante 2003).
7. Summary and conclusion During the early years of independence, African countries took some measures to promote economic growth and development. They prepared national development programmes, created development agencies and negotiated loans. However, the efforts taken by African countries did not go far because of various reasons. These include small sized African markets, high proportion of GDP represented by agriculture, low level of industrialization, lack of resources, colonial legacy, limited institutional capacity and debt. All these factors posed serious challenges for Africa's economic and political unity. A number of powerful factors still militate against effective economic integration. Most African countries are exporters of raw materials, especially agricultural and mineral products, and compete with one another for markets. Industrial production is concentrated in a relatively small number of countries, and is not significant on a global scale. Levels of domestic and inward investment remain low, and recent world trade agreements are not bringing any appreciable benefits to the continent. Until African economies are able to achieve respectable rates of growth and poverty reduction, the prospects for integration will remain dim. Regional integration has been regarded almost as a panacea by many regions of the world, including Africa. The strength in numbers has been regarded as key for turning regional public bads into regional public goods. As a result of potential economic benefits, almost all the regions of the world have established some form of regional organisation or the other. In Africa, there has been a proliferation of regional economic organisations, with all countries belonging to more than one. This has resulted into problems of co-ordination, linkages and common strategies for development among these bodies. The birth of AU and NEPAD promise some changes to the current social and political impasse. Both institutions, especially NEPAD, have become highly influential in shaping Africa's development trajectory and interaction with global governance processes. In particular, its proposals about ending poverty, wars, conflicts, bad governance and diseases have attracted a lot of attention in regional and international circles. However, there are challenges to be confronted. Among these include turning common vision into common action. Africa's experience of regional integration is in many ways a direct contrast to that of the EU, which is till regarded as an important model for regional integration. Unlike the African experience, the EU has expanded and deepened, and its member states have achieved a "degree of prosperity undreamed of, more and more smaller European countries have sought to join, in order to gain better access to markets, and access to the EU’s social and agricultural funds" (EU). Though the EU and AU share different historical experiences in terms of social, economic, political and historical legacies, there is room for collaboration and consolidation of relations between the two regions. However, the current challenges facing Africa demand that AU and NEPAD must learn the good aspects from the EU's experiences of integration. Though learning should not mean using the EU's experience as a template. The AU needs to adapt what is workable in an African context. These include prioritising problems of poverty, diseases, good governance, instability and wars. While the EU might be in the process of consolidating its social, economic and political gains from the past 50 years, NEPAD and AU needs to 'go back to basics' i.e. deal with current socio-economic impasse facing the continent whilst dealing with the challenges of neo-liberal economic globalisation. The successful implementation of Africa's vision requires that NEPAD and AU learn from the mistakes of the past.
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