| NEPAD: What is it? What is missing? |
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By Chris Landsberg Paper written for NALEDI The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) has for more than a year-and a half now triggered a great deal of debate and continues to do so. Indeed, there has been serious debate over the very label of NEPAD, and NEPAD went by many tags and brands .This will attempts to achieve a number of analytical points. It considesr the origins of NEPAD and the link between NEPAD and the African Renaissance. The paper offers a trade union movement perspective of NEPAD and how the trade union movement and other civil society actors should seize the challenge of critically and analytically engaging NEPAD. Introduction The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) has for more than a year-and a half now triggered a great deal of debate, and continues to do so. Indeed, there has been serious debate over the very label of NEPAD, and NEPAD went by many tags and brands.1 NEPAD is viewed by architects and foremost supporters as an anti-poverty, or pro-poor strategy. As such it is seen as a development plan; an attempt to address Africa's vast development challenges. Some have even called it Africa's 'Marshall Plan". More others see it as a development strategy and a programme of the African Union (AU). NEPAD further wishes to play a role in achieving the United Nations (UN) Millennium Declaration, namely of halving extreme poverty, securing primary education and basic health care, overcoming the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and reducing maternal, infant and child mortality in Africa. The donor community have generally been fascinated by NEPAD as they see it as a plan for self-monitoring by Africans. Critics on the other hand depict NEPAD as a 'neo-liberal' project, an articulate a disparaging and disapproving label. Unlike the views of its supporters who see NEPAD as a `revolutionary' plan, critics see NEPAD as a misguided and ill-defined scheme. Critics have even called NEPAD the 'Africanisation of GEAR', South Africa's macro economic policy framework called Growth, Employment and Redistribution, suggesting that it is some super-South African project exported to Africa. These critics see NEPAD as little more than structural adjustment (SAP), and a self-imposed form of SAP at that. The proponents refute this and instead see NEPAD as a development plan. As such NEPAD sees a dialectical relationship between politics and economics. It explicitly makes a link between development, peace, security, governance and democracy. It is based on a strong premise that Africa can't develop if it does not address the continent' serious governance challenges, especially in the areas of democratic and accountability. Whatever label and epithet one chooses, NEPAD has clearly generated a great deal of debate, and sometime angry exchanges, even fall-outs, amongst stakeholders. Also, NEPAD is taken seriously by its supporters and its critics alike. Thus, whether in favour, critical or against, NEPAD should be engaged; indeed if NEPAD's critics stand any chance of seeing critical amendments be incorporated into the framework, they ill have to learn to lobby and engage NEPAD. NEPAD also contains two rationales that are both reasonable, and even worth supporting. These broad strategic rationales are, on the one hand, that NEPAD wishes to inculcate into African politics a culture of democracy, accountability, `good' governance, or more properly democratic governance. On the other hand it seeks to pioneer a `new', enhanced partnership with the countries of the industrialised North so as to involve them in efforts to underwrite such new African initiatives through debt relief, increases in levels of official development assistance, infrastructural development, and direct foreign investment. Thus, NEPAD is based on a trade-off: in exchange for African leaders holding each other accountable, the industrialised powers of the world would recommit themselves to Africa's development. This paper will attempt to achieve a number of analytical points. It will first consider the origins of NEPAD, and deliberate the link between NEPAD and the African Renaissance. The paper will than offer n understanding of what NEPAD is, and how it should be considered and understood. We will proceed to consider NEPAD's own understanding of international political economy, a trade union movement perspective of NEPAD, consider what are the missing elements from NEPAD, and finally offer that the trade union movement and other civil society actors should seize the challenge of critically and analytically engaging NEPAD. NEPAD's origins In order to gain a proper understanding of what NEPAD is, we have to ask the question: what prompted NEPAD? From whence does NEPAD come? NEPAD is in a real sense quite visionary. It seeks to bring about a paradigm shift in both Africa's international relations and intra-African politics. NEPAD was triggered by the post-Cold War reality of power imbalances between Africa and the northern industrialised countries .2 It is trying to react to western military and political disengagement from the continent, and outside powers shirking in their historical obligations toward the continent. NEPAD is also an attempt to change around negative perceptions of Africa. If the outside world were to respond positively and constructively to NEPAD, their re-engagement of the continent would help to arrest growing poverty and inequality on the continent, and assist in transforming the political, economic and social landscapes in Africa .3 NEPAD also seeks to respond to some of the more solemn features of conditions in Africa. The continent is home to 34 of the world's 49 least developed countries and 80% of the world's HIV/AIDS population .4 About half of the Africa's population live on less than 1 dollar a day. Whereas Africa constitutes only 10 % of the world's population, it produces 25% of the world's refugees and internally displaced persons .5 Violent conflict disrupts lives and livelihoods and destroys societies and economies. Thabo Mbeki had long made plain his determination to tackle Afro-pessimism in the quarters of the developed world. He wanted to shun the image amongst western observers, governments and investors that Africa was a continent inhabited mainly by a bunch of kleptocratic regimes that are typically dictatorial, with a strong penchant for violating human rights and democracy. But NEPAD is not only attempt to turn around Africa's image abroad. NEPAD is also targeting African constituencies, most notably African governing elites. NEPAD's hope is that Africans should break with the culture and attitude of victimisation. It sees itself as pursuing a very `mature' approach by breaking with a perceived tendency of blaming the outside world for all of Africa's ills. It hopes to do so by inculcating into African politics a culture of `taking responsibility' for Africa's own mistakes, and by becoming more self-critical of African political development. The view about the west in Africa in turn was that of a club of powerful white governments who are racist towards Africa, and who viewed Africa as having lost its strategic significance after the Cold War. Such governments gradually shirked in their economic and political obligations towards the continent as they saw little point in sending their troops to far-off countries in the 'Dark Continent' of which they knew little about and cared even less. Both t home and abroad Mbeki set out to become the president of redress at home. Mbeki wanted to introduce the ideas of redress and partnership into African-Western relations, and North-South relations more broadly. To this end, Mbeki initiated `a new partnership' between these blocks that could only come about through the building of new bridges between Africa and the outside world. For Mbeki, 'partnership' can only come about if Africa and the industrialised are locked into mutually accountable pacts. The pacts should be based on the idea of Africa's becoming more democratically accountable while northern states had to recommit themselves to participating in Africa's vast development challenges. Of course the question arises whether in fact there could be 'genuine' partnership between unequals; whether western and other industrialised powers would really be willing to take Africa seriously and view it as a strategic partner that matters? Thus, NEPAD is a bold and ambitious political project. It seeks to redefine and alter power relations between one of the world's poorest continent's – Africa – and the world most powerful and dominant actors – the industrialized North. NEPAD: the African Renaissance Operationalised? Before becoming president in June 1999, Mbeki and his South African colleagues in government and the African National Congress worked on articulating a vision of an African Renaissance, that is African political, economic and social renewal. After spending most of the period 1995-99 articulating and refining the vision of the African Renaissance, Mbeki and his government, in partnership with other African partners, started with efforts to translate the 'new Agenda for African Recovery' into concrete plans of action. Such an agenda, policies and plans of action had to generate new forms of co-operation and articulate mutual interests between Africa and the developed world. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is a concrete manifestation of this 'new agenda'; it is the African Renaissance in operation. NEPAD's architects targeted Africa's multilateral regional and sub-regional organisations as key agents to support the new agenda. But a plan based on a South African hegemonic diktat would clearly fail. NEPAD could come to fruition only if it is based on partnerships amongst key African states. For example, in July 1999, the OAU summit in Algeria, as well as the OAU Extraordinary summit held in Sirte, Libya during September 1999, mandated three countries – Algeria in its capacity as chair of the OAU, South Africa in its capacity as chair of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), and Nigeria in its capacity as the chair of the Group-of-77 within the UN – to engage the developed countries on the 'total cancellation of Africa's external debt' and promote efforts to close the digital divide between the continent and those industrialised countries. One year later, during the 2000 OAU summit in Togo, these three countries received a broader mandate to engage the developed North with a view to developing a constructive partnership for the regeneration of the Continent. Following from this, the three Presidents raised the issue of a partnership with the leaders of the G-8 at their summit in Japan during July 2000. The work of developing a Millennium Africa Recovery Plan (MAP) then began in earnest as an extensive program on bilateral and multilateral engagement started. A presentation on MAP was made to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland in January 2001. While these countries worked on MAP, Senegalese president Abdulaye Wade and other francophone African countries worked on the OMEGA Plan, essentially an infrastructural development plan . The OMEGA Plan was first presented at the Franco-Africa Summit in Yaounde, Cameroon in January 2001. It was also presented at the OAU Extraordinary Summit in Sirte. However, the African continent has a post-colonial history of Anglophone-Francophone political rivalries. In order to void yet more enmity, the MAP leaders mandated South African President Thabo Mbeki to interact with his Senegalese counterpart in order to bring about a merger between MAP and OMEGA. Just before the 2001 OAU summit Lusaka, Zambia, Wade visited South Africa, and the two leaders and their respective teams finalised plans and successfully merged MAP and OMEGA and named the integrated plan the New African Initiative (NAI) . The Lusaka summit endorsed NAI and mandated the leaders to fine-tune the new plan into a partnership between Africa and the industrialised powers of the world. In October 2001, African leaders met in Abuja, Nigeria and launched NEPAD . The NEPAD represents a vision by those African states, which signed on, together with the OAU, to reposition Africa globally, eradicate poverty and to place the continent on the road to sustainable development. It is premised on the attainment of peace and stability through sound governance based on democratic values and principles. At its launch, NEPAD leaders stated its overall purpose as that of giving practical effect to the African Renaissance vision. In exchange for Africa's governing elites holding each other politically and economically accountable, the industrialised powers of the world will supplement Africa's peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts, and their attempts to eradicate poverty, by renewing their commitments to greater flows in official development assistance (ODA), debt relief, enhanced flows in private capital (foreign direct investment), and investing in infrastructure, information technology, human resource development – notably in education and health – and providing greater market access for Africa's trading goods to the North. In short, NEPAD is premised on the attaining of peace and stability in Africa through sound governance, based on democratic principles and values. This is to be reinforced by new commitments by Northern powers in the form of financial assistance and enhancing the continents capacities to consolidate peace and democracy. Yet, in proposing the new partnership, NEPAD recognises that Africa holds the key to its own development. NEPAD singles out three prerequisites for social and economic regeneration, poverty alleviation and empowerment: 1. Peace and Security; 2. Democracy and Political Governance; and 3. Economic and Corporate Governance. This is clearly illustrated by the dictum: 'no peace without development; no development without peace'. NEPAD goes further and asserts that, of crucial importance to Africa and the rest of the world is the establishment and protection of a political order and system of governance that are:
NEPAD acknowledges that in those regions and countries marred by armed conflict, the overwhelming priorities are to achieve peace, to disarm and demobilise combatants, and to resettle refugees. Africa's capacity to prevent, mediate and resolve conflicts on the continent must strengthen, including, including the capacity to deploy African peacekeeping forces when necessary. NEPAD recognises that if peace and security is to lead to sustained growth and development, it is of the utmost urgency that the capacity of the state in Africa to fulfil its responsibilities be strengthened. These responsibilities include poverty eradication and development, entrenching democracy, human rights and respect for the rule of law, creating a conducive environment for private sector mobilisation, and responding appropriately to the process of globalisation . Only if the state is equipped with the capacity to deliver, can it provide an unambiguous and tangible indication that good governance offers a better alternative to the practices of the past. It is therefore vital for the industrialised powers to realise that a new partnership between themselves and African multilateral institutions on the one hand, and African states on the other, are vital to bring about peace, democracy and development in Africa. The Governing Structure of NEPAD is composed of an Implementation Committee of Heads of State and Government; a Steering Committee and a Secretariat. President Obasanjo has been elected Chairman of the Implementation Committee, and presidents Bouteflika and Wade as his deputy chairmen. The Midrand headquarters of the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) was chosen as the location of the NEPAD Secretariat. NEPAD members have worked on elaborating Action Plans for five sectors:
These efforts include the establishment of political and economic Good Governance Peer Review Mechanisms, those sets of norms, values and criteria by which African elites commit to hold each other accountable . Both Peer Review Mechanisms stress the need to generate the necessary political will to keep the core values, commitments and obligations of NEPAD and other legal instruments. The mechanisms pledge to empower people and institutions within civil society to ensure an active and independent civil society that can hold government accountable; to adhere to the principles of constitutional democracy, the rule of law and the strict separation of powers; to promote political representivity; ensuring the periodic democratic renewal of leadership; ensuring impartial, transparent and credible electoral administration and oversight systems; ensuring the effective participation of women, minorities and disadvantaged groups in political and economic processes; combat and eradicate corruption . For example, the initial drafts of the Political and Good Governance Peer Review Mechanism stress the importance of 'political will' to keep to core values, commitments and obligations on democracy, human rights and good governance. It recognises the need to `empower people and institutions of civil society' so as to ensure an active and independent civil society that can hold government accountable to the people'. It stresses the need to 'adhere to principles of a constitutional democracy, the rule of law and the strict separation of powers, including the protection of the independence of the judiciary'. It hopes to ensure 'the periodic democratic renewal of leadership, in line with the principle that leaders should be subjected to fixed terms in office'. It is committed to the 'freedom of expression, inclusive of a guaranteed free media'. Importantly for those who work in electoral administration, the Peer Review Process commits those signed-up members to ensuring 'impartial, transparent and credible electoral administration and oversight systems'. It promotes a 'dedicated, honest and efficient civil service', and wishes to 'establish oversight institutions providing necessary surveillance, and to ensure transparency and accountability by all layers of government'. It is also strongly in favour of creation and strengthening of 'institutional capacity to ensure the proper functioning of democratic institutions and instruments'. The Economic and Corporate Governance Peer Review Mechanism on its part goes beyond just neo-liberal economic and fiscal dictates. It recognises that good political good governance is a prerequisite for good economic and corporate good governance. It says the ability of the state to deliver on its promises is key. The peer review singles out a number of areas in need of institutional reform. These include: administrative and civil service; strengthening parliamentary oversight; promoting participatory decision-making; adopting effective measures to combat corruption and embezzlement; and undertaking judicial reforms. It states that the key factors that enhance good governance of economies are transparency, accountability, an enabling environment for private sector development and growth, and institutional capacity and effectiveness. NEPAD's convergence with SADC and ECOWAS restructuring, to mention two sub-regional examples, is allowing for it to influence and become incorporated into the new emerging SADC framework at the same time that Pretoria is about to host the launch of the AU. These convergences place South Africa in an advantageous strategic position to manage the development of synergies between these different initiatives which, in turn, provide the UN an excellent opportunity to reinforce this process starting with SADC restructuring and South Africa's role involvement in those changes. NEPAD's view on the global political-economy Contrary to much criticism that NEPAD only focus on partnership with the outside world, and does not talk enough about intra-African partnerships, NEPAD does have clear political economy perspectives on the African dimension . The political-economy view first speaks to the issue of infrastructural development. NEPAD points out that the building of cross-border and trans-African road networks, railways and other means of transport and communication, and the consolidation of joint energy, water and other systems will be far more effective and beneficial than 'economies of scale'. It underscores the regional and sub-regional dimensions when it calls for the creation of 'essential regional public good' in order to 'enhance regional co-operation and trade'. NEPAD places great emphasis on 'capital flows', especially in the form of 'investment', within Africa and from abroad. In NEPAD's own words, there is `…an urgent need to create conditions that promote private sector investment by both domestic and foreign investors'. NEPAD encourages 'the promotion of intra-African trade and investments' through 'the harmonisation of economic and investment policies and practices'. NEPAD offers 'great opportunities for investment', especially through 'public-private partnerships', as well as 'lowering the risks facing private investors'. NEPAD proposes the establishment of a Financial Market Integration Task Force to 'speed up financial market integration'. NEPAD further calls for 'the deepening of financial markets within countries, as well as cross-border harmonisation and integration'. The 'co-ordination of national sector policies and effective monitoring of regional decisions', and `the promotion of policy and regulatory harmonisation', according to NEPAD, is necessary) 'to facilitate cross-border interaction and market-enlargement'. NEPAD aptly recognises that most African economies are vulnerable because of their dependence on primary production and resource-based sectors'. African economies have 'narrow export bases' and they are in `urgent need to diversify production'. It is vital, says NEPAD, that African countries 'pool' or combine their resources within regional production strategies, and stimulate 'cross-border interactions among African firms', as well as `cross-border inter-sectoral linkages'. NEPAD speaks out and attacks the 'absence of fair and just rules' as far as the global trading system is concerned, and seeks to address the 'unfavourable terms of trade' facing Africa. It also speaks out against 'biases in economic policy and instability in world commodity prices' that affect Africa negatively. As such, NEPAD seeks 'a new global partnership' and pronounce that international multilateral institutions and the world's most industrialised nations have an 'obligation' to negotiate more favourable terms of trade for African countries within the multilateral framework'. NEPAD further encourages African states to actively engage the multilateral system of rules and regulations being created and implemented under the World Trade Organisation (WTO). NEPAD also recognises 'the new trading opportunities that emerge from the evolving multilateral trading system. On globalisation, NEPAD says there are `increased costs' caused by globalisation and on 'Africa's ability to compete'. NEPAD states that costs of global processes `have been born disproportionately by Africa'. The absence of fair and just rules mean there has been an increase in '…the ability of the strong to the detriment of the weak', and that 'increasing polarisation of wealth and poverty is one of the number one processes that have accompanied globalisation'. NEPAD speaks of '…negative as well as positive aspects of globalisation'. However, NEPAD also perceived 'the unparalleled opportunities that globalisation has offered to some previously poor countries', and that 'pursuit of greater openness of the global economy has created opportunities for lifting millions out of poverty'. NEPAD speaks out against the polarisation and 'widening wealth-poverty gap'. What NEPAD should also have done is to speak out against the particularistic policies of specific countries, notably the G-7, and how the policies and behaviour of such countries determine the effects globalisation. After all, NEPAD seeks a `new partnership' and association, a transformation of power relations between Africa and the west. NEPAD makes a strong plea that Africa's marginalisation needs to be ended as a matter of urgency and that Africa needs to be reintegrated into the global economy. The problem with NEPAD is that it seems to be built on an assumption that its policy prescriptions would naturally lead to an altered global order because of those very policies. Well, NEPAD might soon realise that the outside world is not sympathetic as it first thought; it may therefore have to go back to the drawing board to reconsider some of its very policy contours. Operationalising and Implementing NEPAD Between December 2001 and June 2002, African leaders and their delegations rushed frantically to put together action plans to concretise the new agenda for Africa. Problem is that these plans were drawn up more to engage external partners, not so much other African stakeholders. It was designed specifically to engage the leaders of the G-8 industrialised powers. African leaders put together actions plans on infrastructural development, debt relief, market access, and capacity development. African leaders also finalised their Political Good Governance and Economic and Finance Good Governance Peer Review Mechanisms. The hope was that, with demonstrating seriousness on their part, the G-8 would respond by showing commitment to the principles and practice of mutual responsibility and mutual accountability. In other words the G-8 would make commitments in favour of debt relief, ODA reform, market access for Africa's trading goods abroad, and resources for capacity building and consolidation. This process of engaging powerful external partners culminated in the G-8 Summit in Kananaskis, Canada. The idea was that African states would make commitments in favour of democratic governance and accountable and transitional political and economic rule, in exchange for the Northern industrialised powers making commitments in favour of increased resource flows to Africa in the form of foreign direct investment, ODA, market access, and ceasing agricultural subsidies. However, if the outcome of the June 2002 G-8 Summit in Kananaskis is anything to go by, then two problems are clearly exposed: a gap between promise and delivery on the part of western powers; and secondly a clear unwillingness to engage in mutual accountability; a process through which both Africans and industrialised powers will have to live up to commitments made.To be sure, Africans themselves will have a torrid time living up to the promises and commitments they make. But the point is that they themselves are under greater pressure to show results, as opposed to their African counter-parts. When considering the G-8-Africa Action Plan that was adopted at the Kananaskis Summit , the G-8 merely stated that they would be 'looking for ways' to help Africa resolve conflicts; offer technical and financial assistance to sub-regional organisations for capacity development; assist in combating illicit weapons; assist to help combat corruption and embezzlement; help to bridge the digital divide and the use of technology for socio-economic and political development; support access for African agricultural products; etc. The G-8 countries were deliberately vague in the commitments they made . They were particularly non-committal on issues pertaining to debt cancellation, market access, infrastructural development and improved ODA. Indeed, the lack of concrete commitments on the part of the G-8 was pronounced. There was not even talk of the important idea of a Peer Review Mechanism for the G-8 so as to ensure that they are held accountable to deliver on the promises made. The G-8 also gave notice that they will not, unlike the Africans, be held to account collectively, but will make individual commitments based on them choosing their on priorities. The African Trade Union Perspective The African trade union constituency regards NEPAD as a 'neo-liberal' project and 'demand therefore that Africa move away from this neo-liberal economic paradigm and opt for social oriented economic paradigm' . The trade union movement also expressed dismay that '…NEPAD failed to link itself up to existing structures – the African Economic Community, the African Un ion, other regional groupings etc – and it is difficult to fathom how NEPAD could be totally divorced from structures mentioned above'. African trade unions rightly observe that the basic objectives of NEPAD '…can hardly be realised, save against the background of sub-regional and/or regional integration, which is only mentioned in passing in the NEPAD document'. While NEPAD often claims to be original and innovative, trade unions stated that NEPAD '…failed to be guided by history'. Most of the issues tackled in NEPAD, according to trade unions, have been tackled in the past. NEPAD should therefore have familiarised itself with past practices and experiments. African trade unions also take issue with NEPAD's claim to be African owned, and they base their charge on NEPAD's perceived failure to consult with other African socio-economic stake-holders. They view NEPAD's approach as typically top-down, or as they put it `up-down'. The trade union movement says NEPAD should be regarded as work in progress, `a working platform that needs re-crafting and re-casting in order to avoid the pitfalls which earlier programmes had encountered'. There is need for a `mutually beneficial symmetry in the partnership concept…'. African trade unions are sceptical, even cynical, about NEPAD's ability to bring about a transformation in African-Northern relations. They hence make plea to NEPAD's architects to work towards a genuine transformation of power relations. The trade unions say that more emphasis needs to be put on regional and sub-regional integration in Africa. The trade unions make the key point that the state has a key role to play in Africa's development and the position of the outside world that the role of the state needs diminishing should be strongly challenged. A central argument emanating from the trade union movement is that, unless Africa's debilitating debt crisis is addressed, all engagement and efforts will come to naught. Also, given the nature of African economies, strong emphasis is placed on development and transformation of agriculture, in order to promote both food sufficiency and transform the sector into a sector and hub for economic take-off and industrialisation. Significantly, the trade union movement speaks out against the stunning lack of emphasis focus on two of the most important issues facing the continent: the HIV/AIDS pandemic and the gender relations of power. Thus, the trade union movement is highly critical of the scant references to HIV/AIDS and the gender question. In conclusion on this score card here, it is to be expected that the trade union movement would speak themselves out strongly against inequities in power relations. The implication is that, for as long as Africa speaks from positions of weakness therefore, the terms are likely to be set, not by Africans but by powerful African actors. Criticism from other African constituencies Apart from the weaknesses on the part of the G-8-Africa Action Plan, NEPAD faced a more serious challenge in Africa. Criticisms against NEPAD came in two forms. NGOs and other civil society organisations (CSOs) complained about the lack of consultation wit this sector and that NEPAD was a top-down process. This sector was also highly critical of what they saw as the 'neo-liberal' economic prescriptions embedded in NEPAD which, according to them, smacked of a self-imposed structural adjustment programme. The Nigerian Justice and Peace Commission expressed the concern that 'many members of the civil society feel left out in the conception and drafting of such an important programme of economic recovery that will affect the lives of the generality of Africans…The fate of African countries can no longer be left in the hands of the leaders alone along with their friends in the international financial institutions' . On a more positive note, many CSO organisations came out in support of the political aspects of NEPAD, in particular the insistence on democracy, accountability, and good and democratic governance. So, the commitments by some African leaders, even though only rhetorical, to uphold democratic values, norms and standards, are shared by CSOs. This support on the part of leaders has therefore opened a space for engagement. However, just because leaders make lofty commitments does not mean they are ready to live by such commitments; there are likely to be many tensions between CSOs and governments over these very commitments. The second challenge came from other African governments. Just like CSOs, many such governments also complained about the lack of consultation by the NEPAD architects. Concerned was also expressed that some supports of NEPAD wished to see NEPAD as some super programme outside the confines of the African Union (AU). To be sure, many autocratic African governments were critical of NEPAD because they were visibly threatened by NEPAD's strong emphasis on democratic and accountable governance. But there is a real risk that NEPAD and the AU could be played off against each other, especially in the light of strong donor support for NEPAD with little attention In the end, a revised NEPAD plan was adopted by the AU as the 'economic programme' of the AU, and the NEPAD steering committee was increased from 15 to 20 African states during the official launch of the AU in Durban, South Africa in July 2002. What is missing? The greatest charge here is that, in spite of NEPAD's claim that it is building on past continental development plans, there is little evidence to back this up . Numerous earlier initiatives include the 1976 UN Economic Commission for Africa's Revised Framework of Principles for the Implementation of the New International Order in Africa. This plan in turn fed into the 1979 Monrovia Strategy, the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos of 1980, as well as the 1989 The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment (AAF-SAP). These plans all raise four fundamental principles for an African development strategy: 1) self-reliance; 2) self-sustainment and self-sustainability; 3) the democratisation of the development process; and 4) equitable distribution of resources through progressive eradication of unemployment and mass poverty. The AAF-SAP spelled out the need to pay attention to vulnerable groups and to create landing pads for them through social safety nets. One of Africa's most respected development economists, Prof Adebajo Adejedi says that the old 'African Agenda' of the 1980s and early 1990s were deliberately undermined, even opposed by the World bank and IMF, and other powerful Northern actors . They opposed it mainly through an internationally imposed post-Cold Structural Adjustment (SA) regime. Adedeji goes further and concede in frank fashion that African leaders too showed little commitment to realise the goals of that Africa, agenda. African states were to caught up with their own interests and power struggles than trying to turn around Africa's development condition . The other major problem in NEPAD is that is does not criticise the history and sometimes debilitating effects of the global structural adjustment regime at all. Adedeji also states that NEPAD also fails to criticise the western world for their historical role in the under-development of Africa. Another key weakness of NEPAD is that, like many other initiatives in the past, it was an essentially elite driven initiative, crafted almost exclusively by heads of state and government, and state-dominated institutions. From the word go therefore, NEPAD set itself up for a legitimacy crisis by not opening itself up to other key non-state constituencies. It would be more properly to say that, like the debate about the South African policy practice in the post-1994 period, policy-making and decision-making have been exclusivist, and not open to scrutiny. Public participation in policy-making is weak, sometimes even non-existent. Like in the South African policy-making terrain, the NEPAD policy terrain should also be opened up and democratised so that other key stakeholders play a key role in determining NEPAD's policy content. Conclusion The paper has argued that NEPAD has its origins in the African Renaissance discourse, which was in vogue between 1994-99. The paper argued that, while critics saw this call for an African Renaissance as a shallow vision devoid of content, in reality it was a simple call for action. It was an appeal for African leaders to commit themselves to clean and accountable governance, democracy and to respect the basic tenets of human rights. It was a quest to reintegrate Africa back into the global economy through free-market dictates. The paper further argued that NEPAD became the plan of action of the African Renaissance. NEPAD rightly accepted that development is impossible in the absence of true democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance. Therefore, with NEPAD, those members who have signed up and are committed undertakes to respect the `new' African standards of democracy, including political pluralism, allowing for the existence of several political parties, workers' unions, and fair, open and democratic elections that are periodically organised. The paper posited that it is not only Africans that would have to show seriousness in committing themselves to new commitments and obligations. The countries of the industrialised North would also need to respond to Africa's willingness and efforts to put in place these aspects of responsible government by opening their markets for Africa's basic trading commodities and to help end the continent's vast debt burden of some $300 billion. However, it came as little surprise when many such powerful states failed to respond in a really serious way to the call for 'genuine' partnership. Just like we should appreciate that NEPAD is an extension of the African Renaissance – a concretisation of the African Renaissance, in essence the vehicle through which the renaissance would be delivered – so the challenge of implementing NEPAD will be a long and sustained challenge. While NEPAD is based on a straightforward deal, a trade-off as it wishes to end the dialogue of the deaf by locking both African leaders and G-8 and other industrialised powers into a partnership, realising this partnership is by no means guaranteed. There clearly is a need for a pact: that in exchange for Africa holding itself politically and economically accountable, and thereby creating conditions for the attraction of foreign capital to the continent, the industrialised powers will give Africa greater access to its markets, reduce and more ideally end the massive debt burden, and guarantee greater aid flows to Africa. Such resources would help to build infrastructure, revamp health and education systems that the continent so badly needs. Indeed, African leaders have determined that it will require an astronomical 7% economic growth rate per annum across the board on top of a whopping $64 billion to help turn the continent around. But there is a crucial point that many analysts in this country and abroad tend to miss conveniently. It is not only African states that will hold one another accountable. The northern (white) states will also make new commitments to help end deadly poverty in Africa. They too need to be held accountable. It is not only Africa that will put in place peer review criteria in which the peers (leaders) will constantly review (accountability) each other. Let's now conclude with some pointed remarks about NEPAD's weaknesses. Probably the strongest weakness of NEPAD is that opportunities and prospects for debating it seems to be closed, or certainly t best circumscribed. While critics lament NEPAD' policy choices, they themselves cannot be too convinced that their alternatives would be the right ones. The issue therefore is how the space for critically engaging NEPAD could be opened up. While NEPAD's proponents are quick to point out that NEPAD is a continental programme and owned by Africans, for s long as it enjoys the air of elitism and exclusivity, which excludes key stakeholders from making input, in will continue to enjoy an air of popularity abroad and in donor quarters, but not in key African quarters. NEPAD will continue to face a quasi-legitimacy and credibility crisis for as long as people in Africa feel excluded and detached from its processes. Also, the question of ownership of NEPAD can only happen if the NEPAD process is opened up. Even key outside actors like the German Joint Conference Church and Development (GKKE) argued that '…the GKKE takes this opportunity to point to the urgent need for an open political process in the countries of Africa to provide the objectives and contents of the initiative with concrete substance' . The GKKE therefore supports '…the call for greater participation which has been voiced by the churches of Africa' . The Southern African Catholic Bishop' Conference and the South African Council of Churches also reads that, 'While we fully encourage the need for Africa's leadership and peoples to build consensus and stand together for African reconstruction and development through visionary new initiatives like NEPAD, we believe that the process and content of such an initiative must necessarily be informed by popular participation at all stages if it is to succeed' . A further concern is that NEPAD pays scant attention to the critically important issues of gender and the gender relations of power, and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. These are of course major oversights, and the continental trade union movement and other civil society entities should consider developing clear positions and engage NEPAD on these serious omissions. Another concern is that while it is true that NEPAD is a 'programme' of the African Union, we have witnessed NEPAD enjoying a lot of support and attention, especially from abroad, to the obvious exclusion and detriment of the AU. It is important to void a situation where NEPAD and the AU are played off against each other; the AU is Africa's premier continental and pan-African body and should be strengthened, not undermined. The trade union movement and other civil society constituencies should consider how they can contribute to the democratization of NEPAD processes. This presupposes that instead of falling into an either/or approach of rejecting versus embracing NEPAD, NEPAD has to be critically and analytically engaged. But it also suggests that there is a responsibility on the part of NEPAD's architects and crafters to take engagement seriously. 1 For some of the debate, see Chris Landsberg, 'From African Renaissance to NEPASD…and back to the Renaissance', Journal of African Elections, vol. 1 no. 2, September 2002. 2 Ibid, p. 87. |
